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CALIFORNIA'S CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION OF
LEGITIMACY: JACKSON v. JACKSON AND
EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 621
The wickedness of mankind makes it necessary for the law to sup-
pose them better than they really are. Thus we judge that every
child conceived in wedlock is legitimate, the law having confidence
in the mother as if she were chastity itself.*
On August 11, 1967, the California Supreme Court delivered a
four to three decision in Jackson v. Jackson' which, while arriving at
a just result, perpetuated a controversial California law. 2 This con-
troversy springs from section 621 of the Evidence Code,3 which sets
forth the conclusive presumption that issue born in wedlock are
legitimate. This statute, previously controlling only in civil proceed-
ings, was apparently made applicable to criminal proceedings also
when the Evidence Code became operative January 1, 1967.4  Pres-
ently section 621 provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the issue of a wife
cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent, is conclusively
presumed to be legitimate.
Contrary to most other states,5 California has created and per-
* Montesquieu, quoted in 3 R.C.L. Bastards § 6, at 726 (1914).
1 67 A.C. 241, 430 P.2d 289, 60 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1967).
2 See generally Schoch, Determination of Paternity By Blood-Grouping
Tests: The European Experience, 16 S. CAL. L. REV. 177 (1943); Note,
Evidence: Presumptions of Legitimacy: Cohabitation and the Use of Blood
Tests-Kusior v. Silver, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 852 (1960); Note, Evidence: Bas-
tards: Infants: Parent and Child: Blood Tests As Proof of Non-Parentage,
39 CALIF. L. REV. 277 (1951); Comment, Legitimation Through Acts: Acknowl-
edgment: Reception into Family, 13 CAL F. L. REV. 68 (1924); Note, Evidence:
Disputable Presumption of Parentage in California, 11 HASTINGS L.J. 200
(1959); Comment, California's Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy-Its
Legal Effect and Its Questionable Constitutionality, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 437
(1962); Note, Evidence-Bastards--"Exception" to the Conclusive Presump-
tion of Legitimacy, 28 S. CAL. L. REV. 185 (1955); Comment, Presumptions of
Legitimacy and Related Problems, 23 S. CAL. L. REV. 538 (1950); Comment,
The California Blood Test Act v. The Presumptions of Legitimacy, 7 STAN. L.
REV. 388 (1955).
s This section substantively repeats Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1962(5), first
enacted in 1872, as amended, Cal. Stats. 1955, ch. 948, § 3, at 1835 (repealed
Jan. 1, 1967).
4 Provisions in CAL. EVIDENCE CODE §§ 12, 105, make all sections of the
code applicable in civil and criminal proceedings, unless specifically stated
otherwise.
5 The presumption of legitimacy began as a maxim of ancient Roman
law and was later adopted by the English common law which originally
treated the presumption of legitimacy of the issue of a marriage as a sub-
stantive rule of law. 6 Ops. CAL. Aw'Y GEN. 282, 283 (1945); Amnot., 7 A.L.R.
329 (1920). The rigidity of the ancient law was later relaxed in England and
adopted in the United States. It is now generally treated as rebuttable, e.g.,
Groulx v. Groulx, 98 N.H. 481, 103 A.2d 188 (1954); In re Findley, 23 N.Y. 1,
170 N.E. 471 (1930), but it remains a strong presumption, e.g., Eldridge v.
Eldridge, 153 Fla. 873, 16 So. 2d 163 (1944), which social policy requires
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petuated a presumption that is a substantive rule of law6 which arises
when the requisite conditions, cohabitation7 and potency,8 are pres-
ent. Once the presumption is raised, the admission of scientifically
accurate blood tests or any other evidence that would prove the il-
legitimacy of the child is not permitted.9 Thus California must strug-
gle with a law, enacted on a basis of ancient public policy, which
remains operative in spite of modern social and scientific advance-
ments that cast doubt upon the results of its application.
Development of the Presumption in California
California first codified the presumption in 187210 as a rule of
expediency, based in part on the impossibility of establishing an ab-
solute determination of nonpaternity when parentage was disputed. 1
The legal validity of the presumption was justified on the basis of
preserving the integrity of the family and the avoidance of the social
and legal stigmas associated with illegitimacy; 12 the rights of the
husband were subordinated because of these considerations. Since
enactment of the code, public awareness of social problems has greatly
increased. Tolerance has replaced ignorance in many instances. This
has created a need for reevaluating past policies with new develop-
ments in light of the requirements of modern society. Changes in
public attitudes have led to a modification of public policy as ex-
pressed by the courts and legislature. These modifications have
unless overcome by clear evidence, e.g., Boyers v. Boyers, 283 Ky. 1, 140 S.W.
2d 646 (1940), and in some instances, by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
E.g., Holder v. Holder, 9 Utah 2d 163, 340 P.2d 761 (1959). See also MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 703 (1942). In the United States, the presumption
that issue born in wedlock is legitimate is universally accepted. E.g., Mitchell
v. Mitchell, 136 Me. 406, 11 A.2d 898 (1940); Pierson v. Pierson, 124 Wash. 319,
214 P. 159 (1923). See generally Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 729 (1958); 10 Am. JuR.
2d Bastards § 11 (1963). Only in Oregon and California, however, is this
presumption made conclusive. CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 621; ORE. REV. STAT. §
41.350 (1965). See also Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society-
A Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 829, 844 n.30 (1966).
6 For a coverage of the view that treats conclusive presumptions as sub-
stantive rules of law, see 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2492, at 292 (3d ed. 1940).
7 The definition of cohabitation is the living together of a man and a
woman ostensibly as husband and wife in the same house or apartment. See
Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal. 2d 603, 611, 354 P.2d 657, 662, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129, 134
(1960). This reaffirmed the earlier definition found in Estate of Mills, 137
Cal. 298, 70 P. 91 (1902). Cohabitation is necessary at the time of conception,
not at birth. See Estate of McNamara, 181 Cal. 82, 183 P. 552 (1919).
8 Impotency is the inability to copulate, and does not include ability to
reproduce. Carmichael v. Carmichael, 106 Ore. 198, 206, 211 P. 916, 918 (1923).
9 The only judicially created exception to the conclusive presumption
occurred in a 1954 court of appeal case in which sterility was allowed as an
exception to the rule despite the presence of those conditions which normally
result in its application. Hughes v. Hughes, 125 Cal. App. 2d 781, 271 P.2d
172 (1954).
10 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1962(5), as amended, Cal. Stats. 1955, ch. 948,
§ 3, at 1835 (repealed Jan. 1, 1967).
11 Estate of Mills, 137 Cal. 298, 70 P. 91 (1902).
12 Estate of McNamara, 181 Cal. 82, 183 P. 552 (1919); Estate of Walker,
176 Cal. 402, 168 P. 689 (1917); Estate of Mills, 137 Cal. 298, 70 P. 91 (1902).
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wrought change in the interrelation between the law and society so
that illegitimacy, while still a burden, no longer bears the tremendous
sanctions connected with it in the past.
13
Concurrent with this change in public attitudes and social aware-
ness, a field of scientific investigation emerged and became refined to
such an extent that today results of blood tests often strain the
credibility of judicial decisions reached on the basis of the presump-
tion of legitimacy. Prior to 1917, there was no evidence available
which could establish nonpaternity with scientific precision. Today,
blood tests can conclusively prove that a man is not the father of a
child.14 If innocent of the allegation of fatherhood, the average
chance of blood test exclusion of paternity is 55 percent. If a rare
blood type is involved, the chance of exclusion can rise as high as
82 percent.' 5 In 1953, recognition of the conclusiveness of blood
tests16 by the California Legislature resulted in adoption of most of
the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity.'
7
Despite scientific and social changes, the legislature has con-
sistently reaffirmed the conclusive presumption. This was evidenced
in 1953 when, despite recognition of blood test utility to prove non-
paternity, that part of the Uniform Act which would have been in
conflict with the presumption was omitted by the legislature.'8 In
an apparent effort to avoid possible misconstruction of the intention
to preserve the presumption, the forerunner of section 621 was
amended in 1955 by the addition of the provision that it would apply
"[n] otwithstanding any other provision of law ... ."9 Again, in
1965, adoption of the conclusive presumption without change in the
Evidence Code indicates that the California Legislature has not yet
determined that the "social policy" criterion of preventing bastardiza-
tion is outweighed by the resultant inequalities of the rule.
20
Similar to the consistent legislative treatment, the California
courts have continued to apply the rule of the early cases21 uphold-
13 See generally Note, Legitimization: The Liberal Judicial Trend in
California, 19 HAsTnGs L.J. 232 (1967).
14 About 60 years ago Landsteiner discovered that human blood posses-
ses some definite characteristic qualities. It was not until 10 years later that
it was proved that these qualities are inherited according to definite laws.
See Wiener, Determinations of Non-Paternity by Means of Blood Groups, 186
Am. J. MED. Sci. 257, 258 (1933).
15 Schatkin, Paternity Proceedings and Blood Tests, ABA PROCEEDINGS OF
SECTION OF F~mmay LAW 14, 15 (1960).
16 S. ScHATiNI, DISPUTED PATERNI PROCEEDINGS (3d ed. 1953); A.
WIENER, BLOOD GROUPS AND BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS (3d ed. 1946); Comment, The
California Blood Test Act v. The Presumption of Legitimacy, 7 STAN. L. R.v.
388 (1955); Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1000 (1956).
17 9 UmiFomw LAws ANNOT. 110-14.
18 The California Legislature omitted section 5 of the Uniform Act which
stated: "The presumption of legitimacy of a child born during wedlock is
overcome if the court finds that the conclusions of all the experts, as dis-
closed by the evidence based upon the [blood] tests, show that the husband
is not the father of the child." 9 UNIFoRm LAWS ANNOT. 112.
10 Cal. Stats. 1955, ch. 948, § 3, at 1835.
20 Section 621 of the Evidence Code was adopted without change or
direct comment by the Code Commission.
21 Estate of McNamara, 181 Cal. 82, 183 P. 552 (1919); Estate of Walker,
176 Cal. 402, 168 P. 689 (1917); Estate of Mills, 137 Cal. 298, 70 P. 91 (1902).
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ing the conclusiveness of the presumption, based on early considera-
tions.22 The one variable within the judicial position has been the
definition of cohabitation. Defined in the early cases as the living
together of a man and woman, ostensibly as husband and wife, in
the same house or apartment at the time of conception,23 an "un-
fortunate sentence" in a 1946 decision 24 extended this definition to
encompass "conjugal access" during the period of conception.25 This
meant that if the man had potential access to his wife, despite
separation of the couple, cohabitation existed. This departure from
early holdings led to uncertainty in the law which resulted in 14
years of confusion in California courts whenever "cohabitation" was
in question. 26 Certainty was restored in 1960 in Kusior v. Silver,2
7
when the definition was narrowed to the original form espoused in
1902 and all inconsistent statements of the law were expressly over-
ruled.
28
Judicial legislation in California has created one exception to the
conclusive presumption of legitimacy. In the 1954 case of Hughes v.
Hughes,29 the application of the presumption was rejected where a
potent but sterile30 husband was cohabiting with his wife. The court
held that the husband could introduce evidence of his inability to
father his wife's child as the result of a vasectomy3' performed 16
years prior to conception. This was and still is the only judicially
created exception to the conclusive presumption of legitimacy.3 2
Jackson v. Jackson
Into this apparently settled area of the law, the case of Jackson v.
Jackson3 intruded on November 30, 1964, when Garland Jackson filed
an action for annulment of his marriage on November 9, 1964 to
Jackie Jackson. Mrs. Jackson left the plaintiff permanently on the
22 E.g., Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal. 2d 603, 354 P.2d 657, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129
(1960).
23 Id. at 611, 354 P.2d at 662, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
24 People v. Kelly, 77 Cal. App. 2d 23, 174 P.2d 342 (1946).
25 Id. at 26, 174 P.2d at 344.
26 Hale, Proof of Facts of Family History, 2 HAsTmcs L.J. 1 (1950);
Comment, The California Blood Test Act v. The Presumptions of Legitimacy,
7 STAN. L. REV. 388 (1955).
27 54 Cal. 2d 603, 354 P.2d 657, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1960).
28 The Kusior decision overruled the following cases to the extent of
their definition of cohabitation: Bonsall v. Bonsall, 169 Cal. App. 2d 753, 337
P.2d 843 (1959); Waters v. Spratt, 166 Cal. App. 2d 80, 332 P.2d 754 (1958);
Estate of Marshall, 120 Cal. App. 2d 747, 262 P.2d 42 (1953); Hill v. Johnson,
102 Cal. App. 2d 94, 226 P.2d 655 (1951); Williams v. Moon, 98 Cal. App. 2d
214, 219 P.2d 902 (1950); People v. Kelly, 77 Cal. App. 2d 23, 174 P.2d 342
(1946).
29 125 Cal. App. 2d 781, 271 P.2d 172.
30 "Sterility ... means 'barrenness, incapacity to produce a child.'" Id.
at 786, 271 P.2d at 175.
31 A vasectomy is a comparatively simple and painless operation, per-
formed by section of the vas deferens or spermatic cord to produce sterility.
BLACK'S LAw DicTioNARY 1723 (4th ed. 1951).
32 But see Comment, California's Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy-
Its Legal Effect and Its Questionable Constitutionality, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 437
(1962).
33 67 A.C. 241, 430 P.2d 289, 60 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1967).
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morning of November 13, 1964, 4 days after their marriage. She
gave birth to a son approximately 9 months later. Although Gar-
land Jackson was not impotent, blood tests positively demonstrated
that he was not the father of his wife's child.
The superior court ruled that although the marriage relation
endured but 4 days, cohabitation resulted, thereby bringing the case
within the scope of the conclusive presumption. This necessitated a
finding, on the authority of Kusior v. Silver,34 that the blood tests
were inadmissible as evidence to contradict the conclusive presump-
tion. Thus, Mr. Jackson became a "father by presumption. ' 35 Faced
with this established and apparently insurmountable state of the law,
Garland Jackson abandoned hope of obtaining justice and fled the
state.36  In the court of appeal the superior court decision was af-
firmed, again with heavy, albeit reluctant, reliance upon the Kusior
decision.
3 7
On appeal to the California Supreme Court, the lower court de-
cisions were reversed. The court stated that the issue involved was
"whether the child could possibly have been conceived during co-
habitation. .... ,,38 To demonstrate his innocence the plaintiff must
account for his wife's "actions and whereabouts during the ... days
of married life,"39 and prove that the issue "was not conceived when
he was having sexual intercourse with his wife" 40 in order to prove
conception did not occur during the brief cohabitation. 41 Concerning
proof of these facts, the court held that "any competent evidence
relevant to the question is admissible."42  Following this reasoning,
the decision held that the blood tests were valid as evidence to
prove "conception did not occur at various times during the four day
cohabitation, that is, the moments when the newlyweds were en-
gaged in sexual intercourse."
43
In effect, the court reaffirmed the prior judicial interpretation of
the statutory prerequisite of cohabitation as cohabitation during, and
only during, any time when conception might have occurred.
44  If
the child could not possibly have been conceived during cohabitation
the presumption will not apply. To prevent its application the hus-
band must produce any relevant evidence to demonstrate conception
did not occur during the vital period. Normally, blood tests are not
relevant to show the time of conception, but under the particular
84 54 Cal. 2d 603, 354 P.2d 657, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1960).
35 Brief for Appellant at 15, Jackson v. Jackson, 248 A.C.A. 35, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 240, vacated 67 A.C. 241, 430 P.2d 289, 60 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1967).
36 Id. at 1. Jackson's attorney carried on his appeal alone through the
court of appeal and supreme court.
37 "The case of Kusior v. Silver . . . is conclusive against the appellant.
Whether we like it or not, we are bound to hold in accordance with the law
as established by the Supreme Court in that case." 248 A.C.A. at 36, 56 Cal.
Rptr. at 241.
38 67 A.C. at 245, 430 P.2d at 291, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 651.
39 Id. at 244, 430 P.2d at 291, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 651.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 245, 430 P.2d at 291, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 651.
43 Id.
44 See text accompanying notes 22-28 supra.
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facts of the Jackson case, the tests become relevant if the plaintiff
can prove that his wife had not engaged in sexual intercourse with
any other person during their 4 days of married life together. If
no one else had the opportunity to become the father during that
short period, and blood tests negate any possibility of the husband's
paternity, the only possible conclusion would be a finding that con-
ception did not occur during cohabitation. Thus, by holding the
blood tests inadmissible, the trial court had denied the plaintiff a
full opportunity to demonstrate that his case did not come within
the coverage of the conclusive presumption, and for this reason the
lower court decisions were reversed.
45
It is clear that the Jackson decision does not change the general
California rule that blood tests are not admissible to prove nonpa-
ternity of issue born in wedlock. In almost all situations involving
the conclusive presumption, the reasoning of Jackson will not be
available. Very rarely will a husband be able to sufficiently account
for his wife's whereabouts to establish the impossibility of extra-
marital relations during cohabitation at the time when conception
might possibly have occurred.46 However, this decision allowing the
admission of blood test evidence in apparent contradiction of the leg-
islative intent, demonstrated a preference by the supreme court to
limit the application of the conclusive presumption as far as possible
when blood tests indisputably show that the presumption's effect will
be to equate justice with scientific impossibility.
Despite this apparent judicial disapproval of the inadmissibility
of blood tests, the supreme court did not consider it necessary to re-
view again the constitutional arguments raised in the past 47 and by
the appellant,48 for the reason that section 621 does not appear to
be unconstitutional as judicially interpreted in civil actions. 49 As the
45 The Kusior case was expressly approved and the constitutional issues
pressed by appellant's attorney were ignored. The dissent strongly advocated
that the conclusive presumption should have been applied as it had been in
the lower court. 67 A.C. 241, 430 P.2d 289, 60 Cal. Rptr. 649.
46 This situation is further complicated by the fact that the husband and
wife must cease living together about the time of possible conception.
47 E.g., Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal. 2d 603, 354 P.2d 657, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129
(1960); Comment, California's Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy-Its
Legal Effect and Its Questionable Constitutionality, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 437
(1962).
48 Petitioner's Brief for Hearing at 4, Jackson v. Jackson, 67 A.C. 241, 430
P.2d 289, 60 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1967).
49 In Kusior v. Silver, the constitutional validity of section 1962 (5) of the
Code of Civil Procedure was questioned and upheld by the California Su-
preme Court. The court said: "[A]ppellant does not suggest that the legis-
lature has no interest in or power to determine, as a matter of overriding
social policy, that given a certain relationship between husband and wife, the
husband is to be held responsible for the child. There are significant reasons
why the integrity of the family when husband and wife are living together
as such should not be impugned. A conclusive presumption is in actuality a
substantive rule of law and cannot be said to be unconstitutional unless it
transcends such a power of the Legislature." 54 Cal. 2d at 619, 354 P.2d at
667-68, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
This language of the California court is supported by language of the
United States Supreme Court as follows: "The equal protection clause of the
THE HASTINGS LAW JfOURNAL [Vol. 19
controlling case authority, Kusior had held in essence that a conclu-
sive presumption is in actuality a substantive rule of law which is
not unconstitutional unless the legislature has transcended its power
to determine as a matter of overriding social policy that, in the
marital relation, "the husband is to be held responsible for the child."5 0
It is thus apparent that until legislative action is undertaken either
to remove the conclusive character of the presumption codified in
section 621, or to allow blood tests as an exception to its conclusive-
ness, the courts may continue to struggle with a rule that forces
them to render decisions contrary to nature unless the circumstances
are such that the court can find, as it did in Jackson, a means of
avoiding the presumption's application.
Extension of the Conclusive Presumption
A new facet of the conclusive presumption has resulted from
its inclusion in the Evidence Code in the same form it had as section
1962(5) in the Code of Civil Procedure. The difference arises in the
area of effectiveness of the two codes. As a section of the Code of
Civil Procedure, the presumption was applicable only in civil pro-
ceedings. However, its inclusion in the Evidence Code extended its
coverage to both civil and criminal proceedings. 51 This broadened
application results from the Evidence Code provisions that all sections
in that code are applicable to criminal as well as civil proceedings,
5 2
unless specifically stated otherwise. 53 Since there is no limiting clause
for section 621, it is apparently intended to be applicable in criminal
prosecutions brought under section 270 of the Penal Code-the
criminal nonsupport statute. Under prior law, blood tests were ad-
missible to prove nonpaternity in actions under section 270.54 Thus
the conclusive presumption's criminal application is a major departure
from established principles. This extension, whether intentional or
the result of an oversight,55 is in all probability unconstitutional
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Fourteenth Amendment admits of a wide exercise of discretion and only
avoids a classification which is purely arbitrary being without reasonable
basis; nor does a classification having some reasonable basis offend because
not made with mathematical nicety or resulting in some inequality." Lind-
sley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
50 54 Cal. 2d at 619, 354 P.2d at 667-68, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 139-40 (1960).
51 A search has disclosed no reported cases brought under the criminal
nonsupport statute, CAL. PEN. CODE § 270, in which the conclusive presump-
tion was applied.
52 CAL. EviDENcE CODE § 12(a) states in part: "This code shall become
operative on January 1, 1967, and shall govern proceedings in actions brought
on or after that date. . . ." CAL. EviDENCE CODE § 105 states: "'Action' in-
cludes a civil action and a criminal action."
53 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 100 states: "Unless the provision or context
otherwise requires, these definitions govern the construction of this code."
54 People v. Crawford, 205 Cal. App. 2d 858, 32 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1962);
People v. Bynon, 146 Cal. App. 2d 7, 303 P.2d 75 (1956).
55 The only relevant statement made by the Law Revision Commission
with respect to the adoption of CAL. EVIDENCE CODE §§ 620-24 was: "Conclu-
sive presumptions are not evidentiary rules so much as they are rules of sub-
stantive law. Hence, the Commission has not recommended any substantive
revision of the conclusive presumptions contained in this article." 7 CAL.
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In prosecutions under section 270, it has been firmly established
that a civil finding of paternity is not res judicata in the criminal
"action.56 Paternity is an essential element of the offense under
section 270;5 7 to obtain a conviction, it must be established beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is the father of the child and
has failed to support him." Establishment of paternity in a civil ac-
tion is admissible as evidence in the criminal case, but only as a
rebuttable presumption as to whether or not paternity exists.59 Sec-
tion 270e of the Penal Code, amended in 1965 to facilitate operation
in conjunction with the Evidence Code and operative on the same
date,60 provides in part that "[i]n any prosecution under Section 270,
it shall be competent for the people to prove nonaccess of husband to
wife or any other fact establishing nonpaternity of a husband."61
This language seems to indicate that the legislature contemplated the
use of blood tests in the criminal proceedings, and that the conclusive
presumption's extension may have been an oversight.
6 2
Nevertheless, section 621 of the Evidence Code, preventing ad-
mission of blood tests "[n] otwithstanding any other provision of law,"
would appear to override the general admissibility provision of 270e
in any action brought under section 270 of the Penal Code when the
conclusive presumption applies. Under these circumstances, the de-
fendant would be denied an opportunity not only to "raise a reason-
able doubt" as to his paternity, but also to establish conclusively
nonpaterity through blood tests or any other evidence.
The rights of the parties are controlled by the presumption and
evidence contrary to the fact presumed, including blood tests, is in-
admissible as immaterial despite any actual relevancy it might have.
.The constitutional validity of a conclusive presumption does not de-
pend as much on a rational connection between the facts proved and
those presumed, as it does on the constitutional limitations upon
the power of the legislature to enact the fact presumed as a reason-
able means of attaining a social goal.6 3 While the courts should con-
stantly be alert not to construe the meaning of statutes in light of
their own conceptions of public policy, rather than those of the legis-
lature, they nevertheless must be ready to preserve and protect the
rights of the individual when a legislative enactment has clearly vio-
lated any of the basic constitutional guarantees. No reported case
LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES 105 (1965).
Such cursory treatment indicates that the Commission may not have consid-
ered the ramifications of an extension of the conclusive presumption of legit-
imacy into criminal proceedings.
56 Patterson v. Municipal Court, 232 Cal. App. 2d 289, 42 Cal. Rptr. 769
(1965).
57 People v. Cagigas, 69 Cal. App. 2d 301, 158 P.2d 971 (1945); People v.
Kovacevich, 19 Cal. App. 2d 335, 65 P.2d 807 (1937).
58 Patterson v. Municipal Court, 232 Cal. App. 2d 289, 42 Cal. Rptr. 769
(1965).
59 Id.
60 Cal. Stats. 1965, ch. 299, § 138, at 1367.
61 CAL. PEN. CODE § 270e (emphasis added).
62 See note 55 supra.
68 Morgan, Federal Constitutional Limitations Upon Presumptions
Created by State Legislation, in HiowA P L GA& ES$A¥$ 323, 329 (1934).
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has yet been decided in which the conclusive presumption was ap-
plied to section 270 of the Penal Code. If and when this occurs, the
apparent legislative oversight or conception of public policy should
not be given the force of law.64 While it may be constitutionally
valid to require that a husband support the issue of his wife on the
basis of public policy in civil cases, this basis is insufficient to justify
denial of the right to enter conclusive evidence of his innocence in a
trial where he faces possible incarceration for 2 years.65 In Heiner
v. Donnan,6  the United States Supreme Court made the following
pertinent statement:
This Court has held more than once that a statute creating a pre-
sumption which operates to deny a fair opportunity to rebut it vio-
lates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ....
[FurthermoreJ [i]f a legislative body is without power to enact as
a rule of evidence a statute denying litigant the right to prove the
facts of his case, certainly the power cannot be made to emerge by
putting the enactment in the guise of a rule of substantive law.
6 7
This language, despite origin in a federal tax case, would appear
to be determinative in a constitutional consideration of the validity of
section 621 with respect to its criminal application.
Conclusion
California law establishing and perpetuating a conclusive pre-
sumption of legitimacy is contrary to modern social attitudes and
technical advancements. The injustice of the past has not been cured
by either the legislative or judicial activity in the last 3 years. In
fact, recent legislation has apparently reaffirmed the early law and
potentially extended its influence. Judicial results often required by
the conclusive presumption have not met the approval of the courts.
Respect for and support of the law is not encouraged by judicial deci-
sions which are forced to ignore positive truth and justice to the in-
dividual. As one judge has indicated, "[t]his brand of so-called jus-
tice is not substantial in any sense because it is grounded on hypocrisy
and untruths."' 68 The good to be attained by the prevention of bas-
tardization must be balanced against the injustice to the innocent
father by presumption, and the disrespect for our judicial system
that decisions not equated with truth will elicit. As a result of
blood tests, the conclusive presumption of legitimacy has become
in many cases a demonstrable fiction and an obvious bar to truth.69
The full answer to this problem should come from the California
64 "Certainly . . . the binding effect, in respect of particular situations,
of the ancient rule precluding proof of facts to the end of avoiding supposed
injurious results thought to be of greater consequence than the predominance
of truth over error, still remains a proper subject of judicial inquiry to be
made and resolved in the light of such further experience and knowledge."
United States v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U.S. 272, 282 (1934).
65 "The State is forbidden to deny due process of law or the equal pro-
tection of the laws for any purpose whatsoever." Hoeper v. Tax Commission,
284 U.S. 206, 217 (1931).
66 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
67 Id. at 329.
68 Wareham v. Wareham, 195 Cal. App. 2d 64, 83, 15 Cal. Rptr. 465, 478
(1961) (separate opinion).
69 J. McBAiNE, CAL FoRNi EVIDENCE MANUAL § 1273 (2d ed. 1960).
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Legislature, since it is basically a policy decision. As a minimum, a
blood test exception to the conclusiveness of section 621 should be
enacted. Such an exception would place the burden of proving non-
paternity upon the husband.7 0 If adopted, this provision should
adequately protect the interests of the child and society in preventing
bastardization while preventing both injustice to the husband and
possible disrespect for the law.
71
Legislative action at this time, however, does not seem probable
considering the 1965 presumptive legislative reconsideration of this
law in light of prior judicial decisions. 72  If in fact the legislature
does not act, there is a possibility that the courts may create a
blood test exception in spite of the statute and prior interpretations of
it. Such action would be devoid of legal justification. Judicial legis-
lation, particularly that which directly opposes established law and
the clear intention of the legislature, should be avoided. Neverthe-
less, the court may decide that further decisions twisting the applica-
tion of the presumption, as in Jackson, resulting in confusion and
further injustice, are not preferable to a direct confrontation of the
statute.73 Unlike the Hughes7 4 case, where the court was able to
work around the statute by interpretation, judicial creation of an ex-
ception to allow admission of blood test evidence to prove non-
paternity would require an explicit statement to that effect in order
to avoid any confusion due to the strength of prior judicial interpre-
tation. 5
The statutory extension of the conclusive presumption into the
criminal law does not present the same difficulties of modification as
those discussed with respect to its civil application. It is probable
70 Blood test evidence of nonpaternity is sufficiently conclusive to satisfy
this burden of proof. Authorities cited note 16 supra.
71 Possibly a better alternative would be the enactment of a comprehen-
sive body of modern legislation encompassing support, legitimacy, blood test
admissions and other related issues. This would afford the legislature an
opportunity to provide full protection for the interests of illegitimate children
while avoiding the harshness of the conclusive presumption. A groundwork
for such a body of law has already been prepared and proposed on a national
basis by Professor Krause of the University of Illinois. See Krause, Bringing
the Bastard into the Great Society-A Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy,
44 TFxAs L. REXv. 829 (1966).
72 California courts must consider legislative action in view of the fact
that the legislature is presumed to have considered legislation in light of
prior judicial action. Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal. 2d 603, 618, 354 P.2d 657, 667,
7 Cal. Rptr. 129, 139 (1960); see 45 CAL. JuR. 2d Statutes § 101 (1958).
73 For examples of confusion resulting from decisions straining the mean-
ing of statutes, see text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
74 See text accompanying notes 29-32 supra.
75 Confusion with respect to the Jackson decision itself has already oc-
curred as demonstrated by this language in the dissenting opinion: "How-
ever, the effect of today's ruling is to add another exception, based on blood
test evidence, to the conclusive presumption of legitimacy set forth in section
621 of the Evidence Code, and this despite the most convincing proof- rec-
ognized and spelled out in Kusior-that the Legislature considered and re-
jected such an exception." Jackson v. Jackson, 67 A.C. 241, 245, 430 P.2d 289,
291, 60 Cal. Rptr. 649, 651 (1967). A careful reading of the majority opinion
does not disclose the creation of a blood test exception as stated in the dissent.
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that the extension was the result of a legislative oversight which
will be corrected when recognized. If the extension was intentional,
it appears that judicial scrutiny of its criminal application would
rightly culminate in a finding that it is in violation of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
76
Stephen M. Robertson*
70 After completion of this note, the conclusive presumption expressed in
section 621 was upheld in the case of Hess v. Whitsitt, 257 A.C.A. 618, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 45 (1967), demonstrating that the presumption has not been rendered
rebuttable by Jackson v. Jackson as feared by the dissenting opinion in
Jackson. The Hess case held that no evidence of nonpaternity was admissible
when the facts were within the purview of section 621 (see notes 7-9 and
accompanying text supra). The court further indicated that there is no
sound basis for a judicial alteration of the clear words of a statute and its
legislative history. Thus, a child with "chocolate-colored skin [and] features
characteristic of the Negro race" was conclusively presumed to be the child
of a fair-skinned Caucasian couple, even though the wife admitted that she
had sexual intercourse with the Negro defendant during the period when
conception occurred.
* Member, Second Year Class.
